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Luciano Fanti, Domenico Buccella
Pág. 227 - 244
It is commonly believed that the choice of adopting Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) behaviours is beyond the scope of profit enhancement. In a unionised oligopoly with centralised wage setting and decreasing returns to scale technology, the present...
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Marc Escrihuela-Villar, Carlos Gutiérrez-Hita
Pág. 29 - 50
Using the coefficient of cooperation, we analyse the effect of cost asymmetries oncollusive agreements when firms are able to coordinate on distinct output levelsthan the unrestricted joint profit maximization outcome. In this context, we firstinvestigat...
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Miguel González-Maestre, Diego Peñarrubia
Pág. 31 - 46
Motivated by the fact that some regulations involve extra costs for those firms at a size beyond a critical threshold, this paper contributes to the analysis of the welfare distortions due to these regulations. In the context of a duopoly, our results sh...
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Emanuel Broman, Jonas Eliasson
Pág. 232 - 244
On-rail competition is perhaps the most far-reaching form of deregulation of the railways, giving travellers several options on a single line. It aims to lower fairs and raise quality of service, thereby boosting demand and social welfare. Concerns have ...
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Atsuhiro SATOH,Yasuhito TANAKA
Pág. 513 - 523
JEL. D43, L13.
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Satyajit Ghosh, Sarah Ghosh
Technological progress is crucial for economic growth and enhancement of standard of living in any economy. But firms often have insufficient incentive for R&D, because in spite of patent protection, the benefits of R&D are not always limited to the firm...
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Yoav Wachsman, Jie Zhou
Lobbyingplays an integral part in the American political process. This paper utilizesgame theory to examine the lobbying efforts of a duopoly that is competing fora government contract. We first examine a model with a general probabilityfunction and then...
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Claire Baldin
Pág. 78 - 97
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Renato Guseo and Cinzia Mortarino
Pág. 1522 - 1523
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Roberto Contreras
Pág. pp. 19 - 31
We study cartel stability in a differentiated price-setting duopoly with returns
to scale. We show that a cartel may be equally stable in the presence of lower
differentiation, provided that the decreasing returns parameter is high. In addition
we demons...
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