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Ana Paula MARTINS
Pág. 47 - 74
JEL. J51, E24, D49, C79.
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Ana Paula MARTINS
Pág. 1 - 19
JEL. J51, J65, E24, E62, H55, H39, D42, D43.
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Chil Sun Choi, Pando Sohn, Ji-Yong Seo
Pág. pp. 53 - 69
This study examines whether a firm?s leverage can be used strategically to improve its bargaining position with an organized labor union using samples of non-financial firms listed on the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) from 1999 to 2013. Through empirical t...
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I. G. Choi,P. Sohn,J-Y. Seo
AbstractThis study analyses the relevance between the bargaining power of labour unions and the operating flexibility on firms? capital costs by using non-financial firms listed on the Korean stock exchange from 1999 to 2013. Under the assumption that co...
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Elizabeth Schroeder and Victor J. Tremblay
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Katherine Campbell, Duane Helleloid, Patrick Schultz, John Vitton
As a June 23, 2012, vote neared, union workers at American Crystal Sugar were deciding whether the time had come for them to approve the contract offer by the company. Workers continued to staff picket lines at factory entrances, although enthusiasm for ...
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Juan Carlos Barcena-Ruiz, María Luz Campo
Pág. pp. 183 - 202
This paper analyzes the timing of wage bargaining in an unionized market whenworkers can be organized in firm level unions or in an industry-level union. Inequilibrium, the result obtained depends on who decide the timing of thenegotiations: the workers ...
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