|
|
|
|
|
Miquela Forteza Oliver
Pág. 299 - 324
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
María Segarra Cañamares,Antonio Ros Serrano,Francisco José Forteza Oliver,María de las Nieves Gónzalez García
Pág. 29 - 35
Es evidente que el Sector de la Construcción no está respondiendo de manera adecuada al marco legislativo actual, así lo demuestran las estadísticas sobre la siniestralidad del sector. A lo largo de más de 10 años hemos podido observar como nuestro secto...
ver más
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Francisco J. Forteza, José M. Carretero-Gómez, Albert Sesé
Pág. 271 - 281
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Álvaro Forteza, Cecilia Noboa
Pág. 31 - 59
We argue that societies sometimes choose not to enforce the law to gain ?flexibility?. Especially developing countries face a dilemma between discretion and commitment to only partially-contingent rules. Rules are good for incentives, but discretion may ...
ver más
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Cristian Carmona, Gabriel Horrach, Carles Oliver, Francisco J. Forteza, Joan Muñoz
Pág. 250 - 257
The Balearic Islands? Housing Institute (Instituto Balear de la Vivienda-IBAVI), in collaboration with the Directorate General of Nature, Environmental Education, and Climate Change of the government of the Balearic Islands, has received a European grant...
ver más
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Ignacio Álvarez; Natalia da Silva; Álvaro Forteza; Ianina Rossi.
Pág. 217 - 247
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Alvaro Forteza
Pág. pp. 27 - 44
Excess distortions in government transfer policies might result from the government lack of ability to commit not to help unlucky agents. Incentive considerations that are crucial in standard insurance in the presence of moral hazard play, no role in thi...
ver más
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Forteza, Alvaro
Pág. 599 - 614
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
C. Forteza Steegmann, R. Sánchez García
Pág. 87 - 109
|
|
|
|
|
|