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Inicio  /  Future Internet  /  Vol: 14 Par: 6 (2022)  /  Artículo
ARTÍCULO
TITULO

The Robustness of Detecting Known and Unknown DDoS Saturation Attacks in SDN via the Integration of Supervised and Semi-Supervised Classifiers

Samer Khamaiseh    
Abdullah Al-Alaj    
Mohammad Adnan and Hakam W. Alomari    

Resumen

The design of existing machine-learning-based DoS detection systems in software-defined networking (SDN) suffers from two major problems. First, the proper time window for conducting network traffic analysis is unknown and has proven challenging to determine. Second, it is unable to detect unknown types of DoS saturation attacks. An unknown saturation attack is an attack that is not represented in the training data. In this paper, we evaluate three supervised classifiers for detecting a family of DDoS flooding attacks (UDP, TCP-SYN, IP-Spoofing, TCP-SARFU, and ICMP) and their combinations using different time windows. This work represents an extension of the runner-up best-paper award entitled ?Detecting Saturation Attacks in SDN via Machine Learning? published in the 2019 4th International Conference on Computing, Communications and Security (ICCCS). The results in this paper show that the trained supervised models fail in detecting unknown saturation attacks, and their overall detection performance decreases when the time window of the network traffic increases. Moreover, we investigate the performance of four semi-supervised classifiers in detecting unknown flooding attacks. The results indicate that semi-supervised classifiers outperform the supervised classifiers in the detection of unknown flooding attacks. Furthermore, to further increase the possibility of detecting the known and unknown flooding attacks, we propose an enhanced hybrid approach that combines two supervised and semi-supervised classifiers. The results demonstrate that the hybrid approach has outperformed individually supervised or semi-supervised classifiers in detecting the known and unknown flooding DoS attacks in SDN.

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