Resumen
A credit default swap (CDS) is a derivative financial instrument that provides insurance against credit risk. CDSs on subprime Asset Backed Securities (ABSs) paved the way for securitizers to hedge the credit risk of the underlying subprime loans during the onset of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Thus, mortgage originators were least concerned about the quality of loans they securitize since they could hedge the default risk via CDS, paving way to a moral hazard concern. We argue that the core issue pertaining to CDSs, moral hazards, remains unattended even after a decade since the GFC. This paper, utilizing a lexonomic approach embedded in the second-best efficiency criteria, examines the mechanism behind a CDS and develops a regulatory framework with the view of minimizing moral hazards associated with CDSs. Our analysis indicates that incorporating an ?excess? on CDSs may minimize moral hazards, since originators are compelled to bear part of the risk associated with assets they create.