Resumen
Based on the positive externalities of prefabricated buildings, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model between the government and material component vendors and analyzes the changes in the behavior of the government and component vendors in different stages of the advancement of prefabricated buildings. Based on data modeling and equation prediction analysis, it can be found that the expansion of the incremental cost of construction at the initial stage inhibits the enthusiasm of the government. Thus, the government?s incentive behavior effectively affects the behavior of component vendors, and fiscal taxation and punishment policies will promote component vendors to provide prefabricated components. In the development stage, the government?s fiscal policy influence that weakens and affects component vendors? behavior mainly comes from the incremental costs and benefits of components. Additionally, the difference between the builder?s incremental cost and the sales revenue narrowed. At this time, the behavior prediction of both parties tends to be steady. In the mature stage, prefabricated buildings will mainly rely on market forces, and the government can gradually withdraw from the market. The cost variable tends to be lower, and it can be predicted that component vendors tend to supply components, while the government tends to restrict policies.