Resumen
With population numbers increasing and anthropogenic climate change, the amount of available fresh water is declining. This scenario can lead to an increase in the occurrence of water conflicts, especially in transboundary river basins. Prevention strategies to avert water conflicts by designing a fair, efficient, and sustainable water allocation framework are needed. Taking into account the socioeconomic and environmental differences among the riparian countries is one of the most important features an allocation scheme should have. In this article, bankruptcy and bargaining games were used to construct a new weighted water allocation model. The proposed method was applied to allocate the contested water capital of the Mekong River during the dry season. The Mekong River originates in China and flows through Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The results of the allocation showed that, except for China and Vietnam, all the other riparian countries get their full claim of the water demand from the river. The water allocation payoffs satisfy individual rationality, Pareto optimality, and maximization of the group utility. Therefore, the allocation outputs from the proposed scheme are self-enforceable and sustainable.